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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the Brazilian interbank network struc-
ture. We have found that the Brazilian interbank market clearly presents a topology
that is compatible to the free-scale networks. This market is characterized by money
centers, which have exposures to many banks and are the most important source of
large amounts of lending. Therefore, they have important positions in the network
taken into account by the minimal spanning tree and the power domination mea-
sures of the network. We have also developed a methodology to compare di®erent
banks and their relative importance in the network.




A recent ¯nancial literature has exploited the di®erences in the various dimen-
sions of the banking ¯rms such as origin (domestic or foreign), size (large or
small), control (public or private), sector (retail, treasury, business, credit) as
factors that de¯ne role, strategy and performance.
? The authors wish to thank the suggestions made by Carlos Hamilton Araujo,
which have helped to improve the paper. The opinions expressed in this paper are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Central Bank
of Brazil. Daniel O. Cajueiro and Benjamin M. Tabak gratefully acknowledge a
researchgrantfromCNPQfoundation.
3La porta et al. (2002) showed that government ownership of banks in 1970 is
associated with lower productivity growth. Bonin et al. (2005) investigating
the impact of bank privatization in transition economies reinforces this idea
suggesting that early-privatized banks are more e±cient than later privatized
banks. Di Patti and Hardy (2005) have shown that new private banks are
the most e±cient in Pakistan. In fact, it seems that in most situations bank
privatization has increased e±ciency, but less than is typically observed in non-
banking industries [Megginson (2005)]. For instance, Nakane and Weintraub
(2005) have shown that state-owned banks are less e±cient than the private
banks. However, the evidence of improvement provided by private ownership
is mixed. Altunbas et al. (2001) has shown that in the German banking mar-
ket there is indication that public and mutual banks have cost and pro¯t
advantages over their private peers.
An interesting branch of this literature is to study diverse aspects of foreign
ownership of banks. Clarke et al. (2003) review the causes of foreign bank
entry in developing economies. Peria and Mody (2004) study how foreign par-
ticipation and concentration impact bank spreads and Clarke et al. (2005)
assess how lending to small business is a®ected by foreign entry. Furthermore,
De Haas and Lelyveld (2006) investigate whether foreign and domestic banks
react di®erently to business cycles and crises. In this context, several works
have also investigated the di®erences of e±ciency between foreign and domes-
tic banks. For example, Sturm and Willians (2004) have found that foreign
banks are more e±cient than domestic banks in Australia and this same result
was found by Havrylchyk (2006) analyzing the Polish banking industry.
Other dimension which is also studied frequently is related to the bank size
in the bank industry. For instance, Berger and Mester (1997) have found that
small banks are more pro¯t e±cient than larger banks. This result was sup-
ported by Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) in the United States.
One fascinating market which has been very little investigated is the interbank
market. The appealing of this market is supported by the in°uential papers
due to Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) who defend that a
relevant channel of ¯nancial contagion is the overlapping claims that di®erent
institutions have on one another. 1 In fact, they showed that there is a strict
relation between network topology and ¯nancial stability. One interesting issue
also considered in Freixas et al. (2000) is the \Too big to fail approach" in
dealing with large banks and money centers. Furthermore, Allen and Gale
(2000) divide the bank system in regions where each region may be seem as a
local community of banks. Therefore, based on these works one may pose the
1 Actually, three types of operations de¯ne the existence of this network of ¯nancial
contracts: the payment system, the interbank market and the market for derivatives.
Here, we deal just with one of them { the interbank market.
4following questions: (1) Which is in fact the relation between money centers
and large banks in the interbank market? 2 Are the large banks also the large
creditors in the system? Which are the most systemic relevant banks in the
system? (2) Are the banks in the interbank market divided in communities? (3)
Is there a role for each bank in the interbank market? Does Bank type in°uence
strategy in the interbank market? (4) Is the interbank market homogeneous
as presented in Allen and Gale (2000)?
In this paper, we try to answer the questions posed above by investigating
the role and strategy of each type of bank in the network formed by the
Brazilian interbank market using a unique data set formed by 109 ¯nancial
institutions and two years of data. Considering as a starting point the empirical
evidence of the presence of di®erences in e±ciency and strategy in di®erent
types of banks presented above, we compare the role and the strategies of these
institutions dividing the sample by control (public, private and foreign), type
(retail, treasury, business and credit), size (large, medium, small and micro)
and bank and non-bank institutions. We have found that bank type matters
as they have di®erent role in bank networks, the Brazilian bank network is
characterized by money centers, in which large banks are important sources of
borrowing and ¯nally that the Brazilian interbank market presents a topology
that is compatible with free-scale networks.
The methodology considered here is based in a recent developed ¯eld known
as complex networks that have been developed in the last years as a branch of
the statistical physics literature to provide a uni¯ed view of dynamic systems
that may be described by complex weblike structures 3 and non-parametric
statistics. However, instead of explicitly using the measures 4 introduced in
this literature, we adapt these measures according to our needs to get a better
characterization of the banks in this network.
In fact, it is essential to stress that the modeling of a ¯nancial networks using
tools provided by the theory of complex networks is totally reasoning. Cajueiro
(2005) using a computational framework and Jackson and Rogers (2005) using
a microeconomic framework have shown that complex structures such as the
ones provided by small world networks [Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Watts
2 Money centers are de¯ned as banks that lend and borrow to other banks, and are
important sources of funding in the interbank system.
3 Comprehensive reviews of this literature may be found in Albert and Barabasi
(2002) and Boccaletti et al. (2006).
4 Several measures have been presented aiming at characterizing the properties of
these networked systems, for instance, characteristic path length (Wiener (1947)),
clustering coe±cient (Watts and Strogatz (1998)), e±ciency (Latora and Marchiori
(2001,2002)), cost (Latora and Marchiori (2002)), node degree (Barabasi and Albert
(1999)), degree correlation (Pastor-Satorras et al. (2001)), weighted connectivity
strength (Yook et al. (2001)) and disparity(Barth¶ elemy et al. (2005)).
5(1999)] and free scale networks [Barabasi and Albert (1999)] are likely to
emerge in social, economic and social interactions. Some interesting empirical
results are provided by MÄ uler (2003), Souma et al. (2003) and Boss et al.
(2004a,b) who have recently shown that ¯nancial networks present typical
characteristics of complex networks. Furthermore, Iori et al. (2007) based on
a dynamical framework, which employs methods of statistical mechanics of
complex networks, have studied the implications of institutional arrangements
on the stability of the system and the structure of the trading relationships 5 .
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model of network con-
sidered in this paper is introduced. In section 3, the measures considered in
this paper to quantify the role of each bank in the network are introduced.
In section 4, the procedure considered to build the minimal spanning trees of
the Brazilian network is introduced. Section 5 describes the data considered in
this paper. The results are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Network modeling of the interbank market
In which follows, the de¯nition of network that will be used in this paper is
presented:
De¯nition 1 A network (graph) G consists of a nonempty set of elements
V (G) called vertices, and list of unordered pairs of these elements, called edges
E(G). The set of vertices (nodes) of the network is called vertex set and the
list of edges is called the edge list. If i and j are vertices of G, then an edge
of the form ij is said to join or connect i and j.
Networks can be classi¯ed as: (1) Undirected: Edges exhibit no inherent direc-
tion, implying that any relationship so represented is symmetric. (2) Directed
(Digraph): Edges exhibit inherent direction, implying that there is a hierar-
chical structure between the vertices. (3) Unweighted: Edges are not assigned
any a priori strengths. (4) Weighted: Edges are assigned a priori strengths. (5)
Simple: Multiple edges connecting the same pair of vertices are forbidden; (6)
Multigraphs: Multiple edges connecting the same pair of vertices are allowed;
(7) Sparse: For an undirected graph, the maximal size of E(G) = C2
n, corre-
sponding to a complete graph. Sparseness implies that the number of edges M
satis¯es M << C2
n. (8) Connected: Any vertex can be reached from any other
vertex by traversing a path consisting of only a ¯nite number of of edges.
5 See also Iori et al. (2006).
6Generally, we should expect that banks are either net borrowers or lenders
in the interbank market. Therefore, an interbank network should be modeled
as a simple weighted directed network. Following this reasoning, the most
important matrix used to characterize the interbank market is the so-called
matrix of bilateral exposures de¯ned bellow:
De¯nition 2 The matrix of bilateral exposures W(G) = [Wij] of a interbank
market G is the n £ n matrix (where n is the number of banks) whose wijs
denote bank i's exposure to bank j ,and ai =
Pn
j=1 w(i;j) and lj =
Pn
i=1 w(i;j)
are, respectively, bank i's interbank assets and liabilities.
Other important matrix that arises in this paper is the so-called adjacency
matrix:
De¯nition 3 The adjacency matrix A(G) = [aij] assigns the value 1, if there
is an edge starting in vertex i and going to vertex j. If there is no edge starting
in vertex i and going to vertex j, then Aij = 0.
Although this matrix provides less information than the matrix of billateral
exposures, it may work well when one only wants to take the topology of the
network into account.
In the next sections, these two above-de¯ned matrices will play an important
role in the characterization of the Brazilian interbank market.
3 Measures used to characterize the role of banks in the interbank
market
In this section, we present the measures used to characterize the role of banks
in the interbank network. These measures presented bellow will be divided
in in-measures and out-measures. While the banks that present higher in-
measures are ones most systemic relevant, the banks that present higher out-
measures are the most important as money centers.
3.1 Indegree and outdegree
Indegree and outdegree may provide the simplest characterization of a bank
in the interbank market. While in-degree is the number of creditors that a
bank has in a given time, out-degree is the number of debtors. Furthermore,
in the bank literature, if a bank has many interbank liabilities (exposures) it
is said to have a high indegree (outdegree).
7Therefore, using the adjacency matrix, one may de¯ne two important measures











Since the degree depends on the size of the bank sector, MÄ uller (2003) nor-
malized these measures dividing them by n¡1 (the maximal number of edges
that a bank may have) and de¯ned, respectively, the so-called indegree and
outdegree centralities as









This is the ¯rst interesting measure that we will use to characterize the role
of banks in the interbank market.
3.2 Value indegree and outdegree centralities
As noted above, since indegree and outdegree do not take the size of the liabil-
ities and exposures into account, it is worth de¯ning measures to cope with the
size of liabilities and exposures. These measures were also introduced in MÄ uller
(2003) and de¯ned, respectively, by value indegree and outdegree centralities
as extensions of the above de¯ned indegree and outdegree centralities

















83.3 In-e±ciency and out-e±ciency of a node
The concept of e±ciency in complex networks was introduced by Latora and
Marchiori (2002), for undirected networks, based on the idea of e±ciency of
communication between two nodes i and j not necessarily connected, i.e.,
according to this measure, two closer nodes have better communication than
two distant nodes. Here, the issue is to use this measure to describe deeper
the position of the banks in the network. Di®erently from the four measures
presented above, where only the ¯rst neighbors are considered to describe the
position of a bank in the network, here we introduce a variation of the concept
of e±ciency considered in Latora and Marchiori (2002) adapted for directed
networks to cope with this situation. Therefore, we de¯ne here the so-called
in-e±ciency of a node





and out-e±ciency of a node





where the characteristic path length d(i;j) is the minimal number of paths
needed to reach bank i from bank j.
3.4 Weighted in-e±ciency and weighted out-e±ciency
Since the measures in-e±ciency and out-e±ciency considered above do not
take the size of liabilities and exposures into account, here we introduce the
weighted in-e±ciency as












9where dw(i;j), the weighted path length, is de¯ned here for the connected
neighbors of ¯rst order as dw(i;j) = 2 ¡
Ws
ij
maxw where maxw is the maximal
element of the matrix of bilateral exposures. The dw(i;j) of the higher order
neighbors are calculated from this de¯nition. One should note also that if the
network is unweighted by nature, then for the ¯rst neighbors dw(i;j) = 1 and
for higher order neighbors dw(i;j) = d(i;j). This de¯nition ensures that dij
satis¯es the usual properties of a distance. 6
3.5 Domination power
The domination power introduced in Van den Brink and Gilles (2000) is a
measure of centrality of a node in a network that takes the direction and the
weight of the relations into account. It can be interpreted in the following
way. If the set V(G) represents a set of economic agents that are engaging
in some economic trade process, then the fact that agent i dominates agent
j can have the interpretation that agent i sets the conditions under which
binary trade between agents i and j will take place. Another interpretation
is that if alternative i dominates alternative j, then an individual or group of
individuals prefers alternative i to alternative j.
Mathematically, in Van den Brink and Gilles (2000), domination power is












In the context of the interbank market presented here, the generalized ¯-
measure is a nice way of ordering money center in degree of importance.
4 Minimal Spanning tree
The minimal spanning tree problem, an old problem in graph theory, is con-
cerned with ¯nding the set of edges of given network that has the shortest
6 For details, see Kolmogorov and Fommin (1975).
10total length. 7 Mantegna (1999), using the correlation between two stocks as
a measure of distance, adapted this concept in order to characterize complex
networks of ¯nancial stocks. Since in the original problem is formulated to an
undirected network with a clear notion of distance, ¯rst we have to de¯ne the
notion of distance considered in this network and, then we have to adapt this
concept to deal with directed networks. This procedure will be apt to identify
the most important relations in the Brazilian interbank market.
The procedure used to achieve this e®ort may be described by the following
steps:
(1) Keep the directions of the matrix of bilateral exposures; 8
(2) Transform of the matrix of bilateral exposures in a symmetric matrix called
here as W s;
(3) Determine the maximal weight maxw between all nodes of the network;
(4) De¯ne the distance dw(ij) between two neighbors i and j of ¯rst order
of the network as dw(ij) = 2 ¡
Ws
ij
maxw and calculate all the other distances of
higher order neighbors;
(5) Find the minimal spanning tree based on a typical algorithm; 9
(6) Using the directions kept in step (1), recover the directions of the minimal
spanning tree.
The role of the minimal spanning tree here is to provide the notion of com-
munity between the banks. Using the spanning tree, as one may see later, it is
possible to see graphically the role of each bank in the system. Furthermore,
since we have de¯ned the distance here in the same way that we de¯ned the
distance in order to evaluate the weighted e±ciencies in section 3.4, the span-
ning tree in this case will be a graphical representation of the most locally
weighted e±cient banks.
7 Details may be found for instance in Hillier and Lieberman (1967).
8 One should note that if there is an edge between bank i and bank j, then either
bank i is the creditor of bank j or bank i is the debtor of bank j. Both situations
at the same time are not possible.
9 The description of a typical algorithm for ¯nding the minimal spanning tree of
a network may be found in any book of operations research such as Hillier and
Lieberman (1967).
115 Data
The analysis performed in this paper is based on information of all interbank
exposures in the Brazilian interbank market. All ¯nancial institutions report
their counterpart in the interbank market and their size exposure. Therefore,
we have complete information on interbank exposures.
The interbank market in Brazil accounts for 10% total balance sheet value of
banks. The exposures are largely not collateralized. The interbank data has
been collected for the period from January 2004 to December 2005 for all
banks and ¯nancial institutions that have exposures in the interbank market.
The sample comprises 86 banks and 23 non-bank ¯nancial institutions 10 .
We consider conglomerates (group of ¯nancial institutions that are considered
as a single institution) in our analysis. Therefore, we analyze interbank lending
between banks that do not belong to the same ¯nancial institution.
We include public, domestic and foreign banks in our sample. The role of
these types of bank is examined by studying their relative importance in the
interbank network.
The Central Bank of Brazil classi¯es banks by main activity. We employ this
classi¯cation to study the role of each bank type in the interbank market.
These types are retail banks, banks specialized in credit loans, banks with
focus in treasury operations,banks specialized in business and others (non-
bank ¯nancial institutions).
We also study the relation of size and bank's role in the interbank market. If
large banks behave as money centers then we should expect to ¯nd a prominent
role of these banks in the interbank market. Such hypotheses can be tested by
characterizing the interbank network topology, which is the focus of the next
section.
6 Empirical Results
This section intends to understand the role of the banks in the Brazilian
interbank market. Two resources are used: (1) the measures introduced in
section 3.4 and the minimal spanning tree described in 4.
10 These are mainly credit institutions.
126.1 Individual behavior and the strategy of the banks
From now on, we call w-in-e±ciencies, in-e±ciencies, in-degree centralities
and value in-degree centralities as in measures and w-out-e±ciencies, out-
e±ciencies, out-degree centralities and value out-degree centralities as out-
measures.
The w-in-e±ciencies, w-out-e±ciencies, in-e±ciencies, out-e±ciencies, in-degree
centralities, out-degree centralities, value in-degree centralities, value out-degree
centralities and power dominations of all banks of the Brazilian interbank mar-
ket were calculated. These results may be found in table 1. It is possible to
infer that the degree of heterogeneity in the interbank system is high. For ex-
ample, domination power (¯-measures) range from 12.8 to 0.00. Furthermore,
all measures are not normally distributed, positively skewed and in some cases
with a high excess kurtosis (domination power has an excess kurtosis of 64.44).
Place Table 1 Here
We also present in table 2 the Spearman correlation coe±cients and their
respective p-values. 11 We have found, there is strong signi¯cant positive cor-
relation among the in-measures and among the out-measures. Moreover, we
have found signi¯cant correlation between most in-measures and out-measures.
This means that, in general, money centers that have exposures to many banks
are also the most important source of large amounts of money. Therefore, they
have important positions in the network taken into account by the the power
domination measure.
Place Table 2 Here
On the other hand, banks that have large liabilities in general borrow money
from many di®erent banks. It seems this is good news in terms of systemic risk,
i.e., the risk of the default of one of these banks is divided among the ones that
provide funds. The strategy performed by these banks implies in high values
of information centralities. Furthermore, the fact that in and out measures are
correlated means that the same banks that sometimes are sources of money
also borrow money from the system.
Table 3 presents median interbank measures for public, private and foreign
banks. The last two columns present a Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of
medians and its respective p-value. The di®erences appear in out-e±ciency and
beta measures. For out-e±ciency measures both public and private domestic
banks have values signi¯cantly higher than foreign banks. This suggest that
11 To evaluate these correlations, the unconnected banks (8 banks at all) were re-
moved.
13on average such bank types may have a more prominent role as money centers.
From the ¯ ¡ measure we have that public banks are the most important in
the network, followed by private domestic banks.
If a bank has a high indegree of value indegree measures then it has large
liabilities in the interbank system (it is a net borrower) with outdegree and
value outdegree representing the extent of lending in the interbank system. It
is worth mentioning that from table 3 we can see that value indegree is much
higher for foreign banks, which suggests that these banks are net borrowers in
this market, with public banks being net lenders (value outdegree of 0.00245).
Public banks often bene¯t from having a large number of public servants
accounts as their payroll is often made through public banks. Therefore, public
banks tend to have high liquidity, which can be channeled to the interbank
market.
Place Table 3 Here
Table 4 presents median interbank measures for retail, treasury, business and
credit banks. The last two columns present a Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of
medians and it's respective p-value. The most important banks in the network
are retail and credit banks with high in-e±ciency measures. Is important to
highlight that from ¯ ¡ measures we ¯nd that retail banks are the most
important in the interbank network.
We compare retail banks with other bank types and found that retail median
power-domination are statistically di®erent from treasury specialized banks
at the 5% signi¯cance level, while it is statistically di®erent from credit and
business specialized banks only at the 10% signi¯cance level.
Retail banks play a major role in the interbank market as their value outdegree
and their domination power (¯-measures) are higher than those from other
bank types.
Place Table 4 Here
Table 5 presents median interbank measures for banks and non-bank ¯nancial
institutions. The last two columns present a Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of
medians and it's respective p-value. Results suggest that banks play a promi-
nent role in the interbank market, which can be seen from all measures. 12
Place Table 5 Here
Table 6 presents median interbank measures for large, medium, small and
12 In all measures the median of bank institutions is statistically di®erent from non-
bank ¯nancial institutions.
14micro banks. The last two columns present a Kruskal-Wallis test for equality
of medians and it's respective p-value. Results suggest that large banks play
a proeminent role in the interbank market. Besides the relative importance of
each type of banks depends positively on size.
Large banks have high values of outdegree and weighted oute±ciency suggest-
ing that they play the role of money centers in the interbank market and also
that they are the most systemically relevant, which in line with the "too big
to fail hypothesis".
Place Table 6 Here
It is important to notice that our sample period includes the failing of Banco
Santos (medium-sized bank) in 2004. The failure of a medium-sized bank
has reduced liquidity to similar banks and borrowing opportunities in the
interbank markets for a while. Therefore, as we can see in Table 6 the behavior
of medium and small banks is very similar in the bank network.
6.2 Minimal spanning tree
In ¯gure 1 we plot the minimum spanning tree generated for the banking
system by activity using the de¯nition of distance given previously. On this
tree, we can identify di®erent communities, and that the interbank market
seems to be characterized by money centers.
Place Figure 1 About Here
Figures 2 and 3 present the minimum spanning tree for control and size,
respectively. From these ¯gures it is clear that private domestic and foreign
controlled banks have important positions in the network and also that large
banks are important as well.
Place Figures 2 and 3 About Here
7 Conclusions
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the Brazilian interbank network
structure. The Brazilian interbank market clearly presents a topology that is
compatible to the free-scale networks.
The Brazilian interbank market is characterized by money centers, which have
exposures to many banks and are the most important source of large amounts
15of lending. Therefore, they have important positions in the network taken into
account by the information centrality and the power domination measures.
Large banks play the role of money centers in the interbank market.Besides
the degree of heterogeneity is high as di®erent types of banks play di®erent
roles in the interbank market.
We also develop a methodology to compare di®erent banks and their relative
importance in the network. Our results suggest that di®erent types of bank
have a di®erent role in the network. Retail banks play a major role in the
interbank market as their value outdegree and their domination power (¯-
measures) are higher than those from other bank types. Public banks are net
lenders, while foreign banks are net borrowers.
Finally, the minimal spanning trees suggest the existence of communities in
the interbank markets, as public, private and foreign banks are connected
among themselves.
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20Public Private Foreign KW p-value
in e±ciency 0.23 0.26 0.25 2.226863 0.3284
out e±ciency 0.18 0.18 0.16 7.004819 0.0301
W in e±ciency 0.03083 0.0546 0.06865 3.269478 0.195
W out e±ciency 0.05935 0.0432 0.0679 1.700748 0.4273
indegree 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.090099 0.0785
outdegree 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.344497 0.5106
value indegree 0.000444 0.00137 0.005325 11.05534 0.004
value outdegree 0.002425 0.000364 0.00174 5.727313 0.0571
¯-measure 1.06 0.14 0.07 11.71553 0.0029
Table 3. This table presents average network indices for the banking system accord-
ing to control. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) statistic and it's p-value are provided in
the last two columns. The KW tests whether the median indices for the network
are equal.
21Retail Treasury Business Credit KW p-value
in e±ciency 0.1405 0.0428 0.013 0.13 9.522342 0.0231
out e±ciency 0.138 0.13 0.03 0.0974 3.871841 0.2756
W in e±ciency 0.07145 0.0215 0.00671 0.0656 8.887594 0.0308
W out e±ciency 0.0709 0.0667 0.0151 0.0494 4.003177 0.2611
indegree 0.02585 0.00384 0.00146 0.0242 10.62448 0.0139
outdegree 0.07015 0.00954 0.00902 0.016 5.499028 0.1387
value indegree 0.002955 0.00111 0.000382 0.00166 2.109468 0.55
value outdegree 0.00335 0.00145 0.000257 0.000336 11.23073 0.0105
¯-measure 0.67 0.181 0.068 0.237 5.529365 0.1368
Table 4. This table presents average network indices for the banking system accord-
ing to type. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) statistic and its p-value are provided in the
last two columns. The KW tests whether the median indices for the network are
equal.
22Banks Non Bank ¯nancial institutions KW p-value
in e±ciency 0.1035 0 20.25385 0
out e±ciency 0.1055 0.0167 10.82355 0.001
W in e±ciency 0.0532 0 20.32075 0
W out e±ciency 0.0539 0 10.87247 0.001
indegree 0.01525 0 20.12038 0
outdegree 0.01037 0.00258 11.16831 0.0008
value indegree 0.00162 0 22.16873 0
value outdegree 0.000691 0.0000246 13.18803 0.0003
¯-measure 0.189 0.0155 9.361743 0.0022
Table 5. This table presents average network indices for the ¯nancial system ac-
cording to type: banking versus non-banking institutions. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW)
statistic and it's p-value are provided in the last two columns. The KW tests whether
the median indices for the network are equal.
23Large Medium Small Micro KW p-value
in e±ciency 0.3 0.29 0.28 0.08 13.5303 0.0036
out e±ciency 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.15 16.20889 0.001
W in e±ciency 0.0891 0.0573 0.0526 0.0325 16.19898 0.001
W out e±ciency 0.09905 0.04335 0.0567 0.0175 14.0699 0.0028
indegree 0.04265 0.0153 0.0184 0.00625 17.16262 0.0007
outdegree 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.06676 0.0002
value indegree 0.02025 0.00354 0.00137 0.0004 28.37359 0.00
value outdegree 0.04415 0.001275 0.000808 0.000187 26.79625 0.00
¯-measure 1.325 0.28 0.237 0.068 17.08241 0.0007
Table 6. This table presents average network indices for the banking system accord-
ing to size. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) statistic and it's p-value are provided in the
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